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TURNER v. JABE
58 F.3d 924 (4th Cir. 1995)
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
OnJuly 12,1978, Willie Lloyd Turnerkilled W. Jack Smith during
an armed robbery of Smith's jewelry store. In December, 1979, a
Virginia jury convicted Turner of capital murder and sentenced him to
death. The trial court imposed the death penalty in February, 1980.
Turner then appealed his conviction and sentence to the Supreme Court
of Virginia. The court affirmed the conviction and sentence and the
United States Supreme Court denied Turner's petition for certiorari.1
Turner's appeals are multiple and, thus, complex. But the history
of his case is necessary to an understanding of his substantive Eighth
Amendment claim. What follows is a brief summary of that history.
Turner filed a state habeas petition in the Virginia Circuit Court. The
court denied the petition and the Supreme Court of Virginia refused his
petition for appeal. The United States Supreme Court again denied
Turner's certiorari petition. Turner next filed his first federal habeas
petition in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia. That court denied the petition and the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. Turner then filed a second
habeas petition in the state court, as well as a second petition in the
federal district court, both of which were denied. Turner filed a petition
for certiorari with the United States Supreme Court requesting review
of the denial of the first federal habeas petition. The Court granted the
petition, vacated the death sentence, and remanded for anew sentencing
hearing.
2
The Virginia Circuit Court held aresentencing hearing in January,
1987. Ajury again sentenced Turner to death. The circuit court imposed
the death penalty in March. The Supreme Court of Virginia on direct
appeal affirmed the sentence. Turner petitioned the United States
Supreme Court for certiorari and was denied. Turner filed a habeas
petition in the circuit court in September, 1988. The petition was
dismissed. In April, 1991, the Supreme Court of Virginia denied
Turner's appeal.
3
In December, 1991, Turner filed his third federal habeas petition.
The district court denied the petition in February, 1992. The court of
appeals affirmed in September, 1994. In March, 1995, the United States
Supreme Court again denied Turner's petition for certiorari.
4
On April 24, 1995, the Virginia circuit court scheduled Turner's
execution for May 25, 1995. On April 27, 1995, Turner filed his fourth
state habeas petition. By this time, Turner had been on death row for
fifteen years. In his petition, Turner "argued that to execute him now,
after he has endured the psychological torture of fifteen years on death
I Turner v. Jabe, 58 F.3d 924, 926 (4th Cir. 1995). For a more
comprehensive discussion of the facts of this case, see Turner v.
Williams, 35 F.3d 872 (4th Cir. 1994), and case summary of Turner,





6 Id. at 927 (citing Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-654(B)(2)). This section,
in relevant part, states, "No writ shall be granted on the basis of any
allegation the facts of which petitioner had knowledge at the time of
filing any previous petition."
row, would violate the Eight[h] Amendment's prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment." 5 On May 15, 1995, the Supreme Court of
Virginia dismissed his appeal on the ground that it was defaulted under
Virginia's "abuse of the writ" statute.6 Turner then filed a petition in the
United States district court. The court dismissed the petition on the
merits and Turner appealed.
7
HOLDING
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that
Turner's petition was an abuse of the writ because he raised issues
which could have been raised in his third habeas petition. In addition,
the court held that Turner could not "show cause for his failure to raise




I. Lackey v. Texas: A Prolonged Stay on Death Row as Cruel
and Unusual Punishment
Turner's claim in his fourth habeas petition was based on Justice
Stevens's Memorandum Opinion concurring with the denial of certio-
rari in Lackey v. Texas.9 The opinion was handed down on March 27,
1995, seven days after the Court's final denial of certiorari in Turner's
case. Lackey involved a prisoner's claim that to execute him after
seventeen years on death row would violate the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Although the Court
denied certiorari, Justice Stevens wrote a special concurrence, noting
that "the petitioner's claim is not without foundation."
10
Justice Stevens stated that the Court's decision to uphold the death
penalty in Gregg v. Georgial l was justified on two grounds: the
Framers thought it was permissible, and it served the social purposes of
retribution and deterrence. However, he wrote, "[ilt is arguable that
neither ground retains any force for prisoners who have spent some 17
years under a sentence of death." 12 Recognizing the mental suffering to
which a death row inmate is subjected, 13 Justice Stevens suggested that
"after such an extended time, the acceptable state interest in retribution
has arguably been satisfied by the severe punishment already in-
flicted."14
7 Id.
8 Id. at 932.
9 115 S. Ct. 1421 (1995).
10 Id.
11 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
12 Lackey, 115 S. Ct. at 1421.
13 Id. (citingln re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 172 (1890); and People
v. Anderson, 6 Cal.3d 628,649, 100 Cal.Rptr. 152, 166,493 P.2d 880,
894 (1972)).
14 Id.
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What have become known as "Lackey claims" thus contain two
elements: length of time on death row and the conditions which the
prisoner endured. It is clear that in order for a Lackey claim to be even
potentially acceptable, the mental suffering which the prisoner was
forced to undergo will be extremely important. Thus, claims should
stress the torture of remaining in suspense for many years, as well as
the mental torment caused by repeatedly coming within hours of
execution before a last minute stay is granted.
This type of claim has succeeded in other countries. In 1993, the
Privy Council held that two petitioners who had been on death row from
1979 until 1993 had suffered inhumane punishment and commuted
their death sentences. 15 In finding a violation, the court noted that the
delay in execution was not attributable to dilatory tactics by the
petitioners. 16 Although the violation was under the Jamaican Constitu-
tion, which states, "No person shall be subjected to torture or to
inhuman or degrading punishment or other treatment," 17 the ruling is
relevant because the Jamaican Constitution is derived from the same
English common law which gave rise to the United States Constitution's




Petitioners raising Lackey claims will face the difficulty of two
procedural bars. First, as with Turner, courts may find abuse of the writ
because the claim could have been raised in an earlier petition. The
second bar is Teague v. Lane,19 in which the United States Supreme
Court ruled that new constitutional rules of criminal procedure cannot
be retroactively applied to overturn judgments which were already final
(defined as when the United States Supreme Court denies certiorari
after the first state appeal of right).
A. Abuse of the Writ
In Turner, the Fourth Circuit held that the defendant had abused
the writ. One way to disprove abuse of the writ is to show cause for
failing to include the claim in an earlier petition and prejudice resulting
from the alleged constitutional violation. Turner first argued that
Justice Stevens's Memorandum Opinion in Lackey made the claim a
novel legal issue, but the court rejected his argument. The court
reasoned that the Privy Council's decision in 1993, as well as previous
United States cases, gave Turner a basis for raising the claim at an
earlier time.
20
Turner then argued that he could not have raised the claim earlier
because the facts which were the basis of the claim had not yet occurred.
Specifically, the length of time on death row and the conditions of that
15 Pratt & Morgan v. The Attorney General of Jamaica, [1993] 2
App. Cas. 1, (P.C. 1993) (en banc) (appeal taken from Jam) reprinted
in 33 I.L.M. 364 (1994).
16 Id. at 384, 386.
17 Jam. Const. § 17(1).
18 For a more expansive discussion of Lackey claims, see Kathleen
M. Flynn, Note, The Agony of Suspense: How Protracted Death Row
Confinement Followed by Execution Gives Rise to an Eighth Amend-
ment Claim of Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 54 Wash. & Lee L. Rev.
(forthcoming 1997).
19 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
20 Turner, 58 F.3d at 927-30.
21 Id. at 930-31.
stay had not yet fully developed. The court rejected this argument as
well, stating that the necessary facts existed at the time of Turner's third
habeas petition. For although he may not have spent fifteen years on
death row by this point, he had spent twelve years. In addition, the
mental suffering part of his claim-such as repeated stays in the "death
chamber"--had already occurred by the time of the third petition.
Therefore, the factual basis for the claim did not constitute "cause" for
failure to raise the claim earlier.
2 1
Because the court found that there was neither a legal nor a factual
basis which prevented Turner from raising the issue in the third petition,
the court stated that it did not need to determine if there was actual
prejudice.
22
Alternatively, Turner could have shown that because "a 'funda-
mental miscarriage of justice' would result from.., failure to entertain
his claim on the merits, 23 the court should excuse abuse of the writ. But
to show this, Turner had to demonstrate his "actual innocence" of the
death sentence (i.e., that he was not eligible for the death penalty).
24
Because Turner admitted that his death sentence was permissible when
imposed, however, the court held that he was not "innocent" of the
death penalty and that there was no fundamental miscarriage of jus-
tice.
25
Abuse of the writ will be a significant problem for any defendant
attempting to raise a Lackey claim, with no easy remedy available. If
claims are raised too early, a court is likely to find that there has not been
an intolerable delay. But if the claim is raised too late, the court will find
abuse of the writ. In addition, if attorneys include an anticipatory claim
in the first petition, the courts may then speed up review in order to
preempt the claim. Therefore, defense attorneys face the procedural
uncertainty of when to raise the claim.
In Turner, the court suggested the possibility of amending a
pending petition when the issue becomes ripe.26 However, this still
leaves open the issue of when a Lackey claim becomes ripe-that is,
how much time constitutes an intolerable amount of time on death row.
As the Fourth Circuit noted, Pratt & Morgan held that five years would
presumptively be "'inhuman or degrading punishment,' 2 7 but given
that executions in the United States within five years of conviction are
rare, it seems unlikely that this presumption would be accepted by
American courts.
B. Teague v. Lane
Teague v. Lane held that new rules of constitutional criminal
procedure should not be applied retroactively to cases in which final
judgment has already been rendered.28 If this rule applies to Lackey
claims, the result could be cruelly ironic: since a Lackey claim by its
very nature could only arise after a judgment is "final" under Teague,
22 Id. at 931.
23 Id. at 927.
24 Id. at 932 (citingHerrera v. Collins, 113 S.Ct. 853,862 (1993)).
25 Id. In Turner, the court also noted a fear that petitioners would
"never raise this Eighth Amendment claim until the eve of execution.
.. [and thus] could never abuse the writ by failing to raise the issue in
an earlier petition." Id. at 931.
26 Id.
27 33 I.L.M. at 387 (quoting the Constitution of Jamaica, Section
17(1)).
28 Teague, 489 U.S. at 316.
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the United States Supreme Court could never validly hear a Lackey
claim, because it would be announcing a "new rule," which is prohib-
ited by Teague. The only way out of the Teague box, therefore, is if a
Lackey claim falls under a Teague exception or Teague does not apply
at all.
The most likely Teague exception to apply is the first one, which
allows retroactive application of a new rule if the new rule prohibits "a
certain category ofpunishment for a class of defendants because of their
status or offense."'29 Since a Lackey claim effectively argues that the
state no longer has the power to punish a defendant, the claim should
come under this exception.
30
The other way around Teague is to argue, as some lower courts
have held, that Teague by its nature is inapplicable to a Lackey claim.
29 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330 (1989).
30 The second exception, the "watershed" exception, allows
retroactivity for"those new procedures without which the likelihood of
an accurate conviction is seriously diminished." Teague, 489 U.S. at
311, 313. Since Lackey claims involve a substantive constitutional
For example, in McKenzie v. Day, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
stated that Teague should not apply to Lackey claims as they "cannot
normally be raised on direct appeal because much of the delay com-
plained of arises in post-conviction proceedings." 3 1 Defense counsel,
therefore should argue not only that Lackey claims fall under a Teague
exception, but also that Teague does not apply at all.
Willie Lloyd Turner was executed on May 25, 1995.
Summary and analysis by:
Jeanne-Marie S. Raymond
claim of violation of the Eighth Amendment, rather than a claim of
procedural error, it is difficult to see how courts would allow this second
exception to apply.
31 57 F.3d 1461, 1468 n.15 (1991).
TOWNES v. MURRAY
68 F.3d 84 (4th Cir. 1995)
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
Richard Townes shot Virginia Goebel, the night clerk at a Virginia
Beach Majik Market, sometime during the early morning hours of April
14, 1985. Goebel's body was discovered face down in a pool of blood.
Townes was indicted for capital murder during the commission of a
robbery or attempted robbery. The Commonwealth's primary evidence
consisted of empty casings found next to the body that matched a gun
owned by Townes, a customer's identification of Townes as being in the
store just hours before the killing, and a fellow inmate's statement that
Townes had confessed to shooting Goebel.t
After a public defender withdrew and two new counsel were
appointed, Townes petitioned to dismiss counsel and made a motion to
proceed pro se. The court granted the motion. At trial, the jury returned
a guilty verdict, and then, after finding future dangerousness, the jury
sentenced Townes to death.
2
I Townes v. Murray, 68 F.3d 840, 843 (4th Cir. 1995).
2 Id. at 843-44.
3 Townes v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 307,362 S.E.2d 650 (1987),
cert. denied, 485 U.S. 971 (1988).
4 Townes v. Murray, 502 U.S. 912 (1991).
5 114 S.Ct. 2187 (1994).
6 Townes, 68 F.3d at 845, 847.
7 Id. at 853. A patron of the Majik Market, Dorothy Moore, had
identified Townes and one other man from a photo array of six snapshots.
Later, she identified Townes from a five-man lineup. He was the only
man who also appeared in the photo array. Townes argued that his being
The Supreme Court of Virginia upheld the conviction and sentence
and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. 3 Townes' state
habeas petition was denied by the trial court and subsequently refused by
the Supreme Court of Virginia. The United States Supreme Court again
denied certiorari.4
Townes filed a federal habeas petition, raising three major areas of
alleged error. First, Townes asserted that the trial court erred in that it
failed to conduct an adequate Faretta hearing pre-trial, that it failed to
conduct an additional Faretta hearing after trial but prior to the sentenc-
ing hearing, and that he was incompetent to "stand trial" during the
sentencing phase. Second, Townes argued that the trial court violated
Simmons v. South Carolina5 when it refused to instruct the jury as to
Townes' parole ineligibility if sentenced to life imprisonment.6 Third,
Townes raised challenges to the finding of guilt, alleging unduly sugges-
tive identification procedures and Brady violations, among others.
7
the only constant between the photo array and the lineup "unreasonably
and impermissibly" indicated to Moore that he had committed the
murder. Id. The Fourth Circuit noted that there was no "flat prohibition"
against making Townes the one constant in the array and the lineup. Id.
The court concluded that because no constitutional infirmity lay in the
lineup itself and in light of the "favorable conditions" under which Moore
saw Townes, the district court was within its discretion to dismiss this
claim. Id. at 853-54. The court's rulings on Townes' remaining claims
will not be discussed in this note. These include (1) a second identifica-
tion (2) an alleged Brady violation and (3) a claim that the magistrate
judge should have recused himself. Id. at 854-55.
